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Abstract 
Although the notion of virtue is increasingly prominent in psychology, the way it has been 
studied and conceptualised has been relatively Western-centric, and does not fully account 
for variations in how it has been understood cross-culturally. As such, an enquiry was 
conducted into ideas relating to virtue found across the world’s cultures, focusing specifically 
on so-called untranslatable words. Through a quasi-systematic search of academic and grey 
literature, together with conceptual snowballing and crowd-sourced suggestions, over 200 
relevant terms were located. An adapted grounded theory analysis identified five themes 
which together provide an insight into the “roots” of virtue (i.e., the main sources from which 
it appears to spring): virtue itself (the concept of it); considerateness (caring about it); 
wisdom (knowing what it consists of); agency (managing to be/do it); and skill (mastery of 
the preceding elements). The results help shed further light on the potential dynamics of this 
important phenomenon. 
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Introduction 
Mainstream psychology has been charged with being rather Western-centric, influenced by 
the mainly Western contexts in which it has primarily developed (Becker & Marecek, 2008). 
“Mainstream” in this context refers to the field as a global endeavour (e.g., with international 
journals and conferences). There have been, and still are, “ethnopsychologies” across the 
globe; however, Danziger (2006) suggests that the international dominance of the United 
States since the Second World War has meant that psychology as studied and practised there 
has been exported globally, to the extent that it now constitutes the hegemonic “mainstream” 
iteration of the discipline. Thus, concepts, ideologies, priorities, and methods associated with 
American psychology have come to dominate the international scene. Furthermore, much of 
the empirical work within this mainstream has involved participants described by Henrich, 
Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) as WEIRD, belonging to societies that are Western, Educated, 
Industrialised, Rich and Democratic. Moreover, many scholars themselves are situated within 
such contexts, which will influence their perception and interpretation of the world. To give 
an example that is particularly germane to the present paper, American English is the default 
language in the field, and as nearly a century of extensive research on the ‘linguistic relativity 
hypothesis’ has shown, this linguistic bias strongly shapes people’s psychological functioning 
(e.g., perceptions of time or colour) (Lucy, 1997). Academia has developed methodological 
ways of addressing such biases, including efforts towards facilitating objectivity (particularly 
in quantitative paradigms), and encouraging reflexivity (especially in qualitative paradigms) 
(Finlay & Gough, 2003). However, even with such measures in place, critics argue that the 
field is still biased towards Western ways of thinking and understanding the world (e.g., its 
emphasis on individualism) (Becker & Marecek, 2008). As such, the field would benefit from 
developing greater cross-cultural engagement, awareness, and understanding. This paper aims 
to contribute to this process, doing so by focusing specifically on virtue. 
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Virtue 
Virtue has been of interest to fields such as moral philosophy for centuries, and continues to 
be through across diverse fields, as reflected in Snow’s (2017) recent Oxford Handbook of 
Virtue (in which Pettigrove (2017, p.371), for instance, defines it as “persisting excellence of 
character that could serve the good”). More recently, it has also become a focus of attention 
in psychology. One of the most prominent systematic psychological approaches to virtue is 
found in positive psychology, particularly in the burgeoning paradigm of character strengths, 
and specifically the Values-in-Action (VIA) initiative (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). This is 
of course not the only approach to virtues in the field; for instance, Haidt and colleagues have 
generated a fruitful programme of enquiry in this area, which includes attempting to 
understand political differences on the basis of moral intuitions (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the VIA has attracted considerable attention, and is widely used and researched 
(even if only mainly by scholars within positive psychology), which makes it of interest here. 
The intention of the VIA was to create a taxonomy of strengths, described as “positive 
traits that a person owns, celebrates, and frequently uses” (Peterson & Park, 2009, p.29). This 
was envisioned as a comprehensive framework for understanding the ways people thrive and 
flourish, offering a “positive” counterpart to the deficit-based classificatory systems such as 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Over a three-year period, 
researchers collaborated to arrive at a schema featuring 24 distinct strengths (Dahlsgaard, 
Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). The selection was guided by 12 criteria (Peterson & Seligman, 
2004): (1) ubiquity (cross-culturally); (2) fulfilling (contributes to flourishing); (3) morally 
valued (in its own right, not merely intrumentally); (4) does not diminish others (evoking 
elevating admiration rather than jealousy); (5) non-felicitous opposite (has negative 
antonyms); (6) traitlike (an individual difference with generality and stability); (7) 
measurable (empirically); (8) distinctiveness (not redundant, conceptually or empirically, 
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with other strengths); (9) paragons (strikingly embodied in exemplary individuals); (10) 
prodigies (precosiously shown by some youth); (11) selective absence (missing in some 
people); and (12) institutions (a deliberate target for cultivation by social practices and 
rituals). The premise of the theory is that people are more likely to flourish if they use and 
develop their particular strengths, as has been corroborated in contexts ranging from 
education (Proctor et al., 2011) to the workplace (Gander, Proyer, Ruch, & Wyss, 2012).  
 Crucially, for our purposes here, these character strengths were selected and defined, 
in part, by their implication of virtue. While moral and social desirability were not necessary 
conditions for the inclusion of a strength, they were certainly key determinants (McGrath, 
Greenberg, & Hall-Simmonds, 2017). This implication was highlighted by Dahlsgaard et al. 
(2005), who ordered the 24 strengths according to a class of fundamental virtues. These were 
assessed as having been valorised throughout history and across cultures, as identified in 
foundational texts from eight moral and religious traditions (Athenian philosophy, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Taoism). Having identified six 
virtues, the strengths were distributed among them as follows: (1) wisdom and knowledge 
(creativity, judgement, perspective, curiosity, and love of learning); (2) courage (bravery, 
perseverance, honesty, and zest); (3) humanity (love, kindness, and social intelligence); (4) 
justice (teamwork, fairness, and leadership); (5) temperance (forgiveness, humility, prudence, 
and self-regulation); and (6) transcendence (appreciation of beauty and excellence, gratitude, 
hope, humour, and spirituality). 
 In this initial analysis, the identification of virtues, and the distribution of strengths 
among them, proceeded on intuitive and theoretical grounds. Subsequently, scholars have 
brought other tools to bear on the VIA, notably factor analysis. Various component solutions 
have been identified. Ruch and Proyer (2015) obtained a reasonable fit for the proposed six 
factor classification, while other studies arrived at five-, four-, three-, and two-factor 
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solutions. Five-factor solutions include: interpersonal strengths, cognitive strengths, fortitude, 
temperance, and transcendence (Peterson, Park, Pole, D'Andrea, & Seligman, 2008; 
McGrath, 2014); interpersonal strengths, intellectual strengths, emotional strengths, strengths 
of restraint, and theological strengths (Ruch et al., 2010; Littman-Ovadia & Lavy, 2012; 
Azañedo, Fernández-Abascal, & Barraca, 2014); and interpersonal strengths, intellectual 
strengths, civic strengths, self-assurance, theological strengths (Singh & Choubisa, 2010). 
Four-factor solutions include: interpersonal strengths, fortitude, vitality, and cautiousness 
(Brdar & Kashdan, 2010); social strengths, intellectual strengths, temperance strengths, and 
transcendence strengths (Shryack et al., 2010); agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, 
and theological strengths (Park & Peterson, 2005); and positivity, intellect, conscientiousness, 
and niceness (Macdonald, Bore, & Munro, 2008). McGrath (2015b) and McGrath et al. 
(2017) identified a three-factor solution of caring, inquisitiveness, and self-control. Finally, 
Peterson (2006) obtained a two-factor solution – corroborated by Ruch et al. (2010) – where 
the first factor contrasts strengths of the ‘heart’ (emotional expression) versus of the ‘mind’ 
(intellectual restraint), and the second contrasts self-focused versus other-focused strengths. 
 Clearly, the solutions have considerable overlaps, and many factors actually share the 
same labels. Moreover, these articles indicate that solutions other than the one settled on 
could have been obtained, since determining the optimal solution is partly a judgement call 
(albeit one based on well-established procedures, such as tests of model fit in confirmatory 
factor analysis; Schreiber et al., 2006). For instance, McGrath (2015b) explores the merits of 
one-, two-, three-, four-, and five-component solutions, before justifying his preference for a 
three-factor solution. That said, he identifies, at the broadest level of analysis, a single factor 
of “good character,” encompassing all elements of positive functioning. This refracts into two 
second-tier components, goodness and inquisitiveness, which pertain to moral concern and 
intellectual interest respectively. Goodness then refracts still further, subdividing into caring 
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and self-control, thereby providing McGrath’s three-component solution. Interestingly, 
McGrath states he was keen to find “common ground” between virtue perspectives that are 
“psychological” (i.e., psychometric self-report data) and “cultural” (i.e., valued historically) 
(p.408). Thus, his decisions around the component solution was based partly on “intuitive 
appeal,” picking a solution “consistent with culturally meaningful concepts of virtue.” For 
instance, he was influenced by the Aristotelian notion of three pathways through which 
excellence leads to fulfilment: social, intellectual, and productive (Curren, 2008).  
 So, there is a burgeoning literature on the nature and structure of virtue. However, to 
some extent this literature suffers from the issue raised above, namely Western-centricity, as 
the scholars involved have recognised (McGrath, 2015). That is not to say the research has 
lacked a cross-cultural dimension. The original six-factor structure for the VIA was obtained 
by consulting traditions from across the world (Dahlsgaard et al., 2005), while the studies 
above cover numerous countries, not only the USA (Peterson et al., 2008; Shryack et al., 
2010; McGrath, 2014), but also India (Singh & Choubisa, 2010), Australia (Macdonald et al., 
2008), Germany (Ruch et al., 2010), Spain (Azañedo et al., 2014), Israel (Littman-Ovadia & 
Lavy, 2012), and Croatia (Brdar & Kashdan, 2010). However, as McGrath (2015b) points 
out, participants in most of those studies could be deemed “WEIRD” (Henrich et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the VIA initiative is driven by a concern with developing a universally applicable 
framework, featuring constructs that appear to be shared across cultures. As such, there may 
be merit in also looking for virtue-related constructs that have not necessarily been shared as 
such, but are potentially unique to a particular culture. Such concepts can be identified in the 
form of “untranslatable” words.  
Untranslatable Words 
Before outlining the significance of untranslatable words, it will help to situate this paper 
more generally with respect to cross-cultural scholarship. It is common to differentiate cross-
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cultural research into “universalist” and “relativist” positions (with Berry, Poortinga, Segall, 
and Dasen (2011) further separating these into extreme and moderate versions). The 
universalist perspective – evident in many studies above – aims to identify universal aspects 
of psychological functioning, possessed irrespective of cultural location. Such work is usually 
guided by positivist epistemologies, highlighting how people globally share similarities 
across human processes, including virtues and strengths (McGrath, 2015a). Conversely, 
relativist scholars tend to endorse some form of social constructionism. However, many 
scholars tread a middle ground, acknowledging universals, but also recognising that these can 
be shaped by cultural context. This ground is reflected in Berry et al.’s (2011) identification 
of “moderate universalism,” namely work that “emphasises that there exist both differences 
and similarities in behaviour across cultures” (p.8).  
One can identify this middle ground in some VIA studies. For instance, McGrath 
(2015a) reviewed VIA assessments across 75 countries. Although the report largely endorsed 
the universality of the VIA, it also acknowledged cultural variation in the prominence of 
particular virtues and strengths. The present paper likewise aligns with this middle-ground. It 
takes seriously cultural diversity, recognising variation in the way cultures experience and 
understand virtue (and life more broadly). Yet it eschews the idea that people do not share 
some universal qualities and concerns. Moreover, it suggests that cultures can learn from the 
variation that does exist, including discovering new ideas and practices that may be relevant 
to one’s own culture. One way of doing so is through engaging with untranslatable words.
 Although untranslatability is a contested phenomenon, it generally refers to a word 
that lacks an exact equivalent in a given other language. (Please see Lomas (in press) for a 
more detailed theoretical consideration of the nature of untranslatability.) Interest in such 
words is manifold. First, they can assist in understanding other cultures’ values, traditions, 
and ways of being (Wierzbicka, 1997). The theoretical context here is the aforementioned 
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linguistic relativity hypothesis (LRH) – sometimes referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 
following the influential work of Sapir (1929) and Whorf (1940) – which holds that language 
influences how people experience, understand, and perceive the world. As one might 
imagine, within the broadly-constituted LRH are diverse positions that to an extent map onto 
the universalist-relativist spectrum outlined above.  
Stronger formulations of the LRH veer towards Berry et al.’s (2011) “extreme 
relativism,” endorsing forms of determinism whereby language inextricably constitutes 
thought. In relation to untranslatable words, this view implies that only people enmeshed 
within the culture that produced a given word can truly understand or experience the 
phenomenon it refers to. For instance, Taylor (1985) argues there is no way out of the 
“hermeneutic circle,” in which concepts can only be understood with reference to others in 
that language. He writes, “We can often experience what it is like to be on the outside [of the 
circle] when we encounter the feeling, action, and experiential meaning language of another 
civilization. Here there is no translation, no way of explaining in other, more accessible 
concepts” (p.23-24). However, other perspectives are situated further along the spectrum 
towards “moderate relativism” and even “moderate universalism.” From these stances, such 
words may to an extent be comprehensible to people outside the culture, holding some 
universal relevance. For instance, Wierzbicka (1999) suggests we can indeed approximate a 
feel for what untranslatable words refer to. One may not appreciate the full nuanced richness 
of a term compared to people “inside” the culture, as “verbal explanations of such concepts 
cannot replace experiential familiarity with them and with their functioning in the local 
‘stream of life’” (p.8). Yet, “it is not true that no verbal explanations illuminating to outsiders 
are possible at all.” Even without understanding a word’s full panoply of meanings and uses 
in its original language, something of its nature may yet be appreciated.  
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The current paper aligns with this latter stance. And, in that sense, beyond just being 
informative vis-à-vis the culture that created the word, such words can enrich other lexica. 
This phenomenon of cultures “borrowing” words is central to language development. Indeed, 
of the more than 600,000 lexemes in the OED, the percentage of borrowed words is estimated 
to be as high as 41% (Tadmor, 2009). Such borrowings are known as “loanwords,” although 
more specific terminology identifies varying levels of assimilation into the host language. Of 
particular interest here is why words are borrowed. Many are what Haspelmath (2009) calls 
“loanwords by necessity,” where the recipient language lacks its own word for a particular 
referent (e.g., if a new practice or idea is introduced to a culture). Thus, the loanword is used 
for pragmatic reasons, allowing speakers to articulate concepts they previously struggled to. 
In Lehrer’s (1974) terminology, such words fill “semantic gaps,” namely “the lack of a 
convenient word to express what [one] wants to speak about” (p.105). Such gaps are what 
make words untranslatable, indicating phenomena that have been overlooked or undervalued 
by one’s own culture, but which another culture has identified and labelled.  
From that perspective, such words can enrich the English lexicon, and enhance the 
nomological network in fields like psychology. This is desirable, given the aforementioned 
point that academic psychology tends to be Western-centric. That is, its nomological network 
largely involves concepts that have been identified in English. It would therefore be useful to 
augment this network with constructs which have not yet been identified, as signalled by an 
untranslatable word. Indeed, such augmentation has already occurred, in a limited way, for 
decades, with psychology borrowing selectively from other languages – “other” from the 
perspective of English, the dominant mode of communication in the field – notably German 
(e.g., Gestalt), Greek (e.g., eudaimonia), and Latin (e.g., ego). (Such borrowing becomes 
more extensive when you consider that much of the terminology that is regarded as English, 
rather than a loanword, in fact derives from Greek, including “psychology” itself.) 
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That said, encouraging cross-cultural exploration of other lexica does not mean such 
borrowing is straightforward. Structuralism and post-structuralism have shown that words are 
embedded within complex networks that endow them with meaning, including associations 
that one could only appreciate by being enmeshed within that culture (Wierzbicka, 1999). As 
such, if a word is transplanted to another context, this network will not be retained. Even so, 
something of its nature may yet be appraised. For instance, the Sanskrit loanword karma has 
been borrowed to refer broadly to causality with respect to ethics. Most English speakers 
probably do not know how it relates to other Sanskrit terms, nor its wealth of meanings in 
Hindu and Buddhist teachings (e.g., in relation to the rich repository of insight and guidance 
found in the dharma, the Buddhist path). Nevertheless, they evidently find the word useful, 
and deploy it in ways not completely discordant with its original meanings. Moreover, in the 
process of borrowing, words organically form connections with relevant concepts in the new 
language (e.g., karma being understood through ideas around sin and justice). 
As such, untranslatable words can help psychology deepen its understanding of the 
person, even if the way it defines and deploys such terms diverges from how they are used in 
their original context. To that end, this paper looks to refine our understanding of virtue by 
considering untranslatable words that relate to this topic. Its two research questions are: (a) 
what concepts pertaining to virtue can be identified in other languages that have not been 
similarly identified in English (as signalled by an untranslatable word); and (b) what are their 
implications for our understanding of virtue? 
Methods 
Background to the Study 
The context for this paper is recent work by Lomas (2016), who is developing a lexicography 
of untranslatable words relating to wellbeing. The lexicography’s central premise is that such 
words can enhance the nomological network in psychology, as elucidated above. In the paper 
Running head: THE ROOTS OF VIRTUE 
12 
 
establishing the lexicography, Lomas (2016) identified 216 untranslatable words pertaining to 
wellbeing through a “quasi-systematic” review of academic sources and grey literature (i.e., 
outside conventional academic channels, like websites focused on untranslatable words). This 
original study did not undertake a conventional systematic review of its topic, mainly because 
there were deemed an insufficient number of papers in academic psychology journals to 
permit that. Nevertheless, it deployed a systematic search process, hence quasi-systematic. 
Readers interested in this process are encouraged to consult this original paper; suffice it to 
say that the process included several protocols, e.g., examining the first 20 websites returned 
when entering “untranslatable words” into Google. Once the 216 words had been identified, 
suitably robust definitions were sought through various means, including on-line dictionaries, 
peer-reviewed academic sources (across all fields of academia), and bilingual colleagues. 
 The words and their definitions were then analysed using a variation of grounded 
theory (GT), a qualitative methodology which allows theory to emerge inductively from the 
data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). It was a variation of GT in that it followed its three main 
coding stages (open, axial, and selective). In a process of open coding, the data – the words 
and their definitions – were examined for emergent themes. This phase was assisted by other 
GT processes such as memoing and initial theorising. Then, axial coding involved comparing 
themes in a process of constant comparison, and grouping these into categories based on 
conceptual similarity. Six main categories were produced, which in turn paired into three 
meta-categories: feelings (positive and ambivalent), relationships (love and pro-sociality), 
and development (virtue/character and spirituality). Finally, selective coding saw the 
identification of a single “core” category, which in that case was wellbeing. Applying GT to a 
lexical data-set in this way is somewhat unconventional, and may not meet some people’s 
expectations of what GT is or should be. That said, there is great heterogeneity in the studies 
purporting to use GT (Cutcliffe, 2005), and arguably Lomas’s analysis is sufficiently aligned 
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with GT principles to be considered one such example. Alternatively, one may prefer just to 
regard it as a version of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) that “borrows” from GT.  
Subsequent Data Collection and Analysis 
Subsequent to Lomas’s (2016) initial paper, the lexicography has expanded to nearly 1,000 
words. This is partly through crowd-sourced contributions to a website created to host the 
project (www.drtimlomas.com/lexicography), and partly through follow-up enquiries by the 
current author via what might be termed “conceptual snowballing.” Roughly, of the nearly 
800 words collected since the initial paper, 500 have been provided by website visitors, and 
300 through conceptual snowballing. The term snowballing derives from study recruitment, 
where participants facilitate the participation of additional people. This metaphor of has been 
borrowed to reflect the way enquiries into an untranslatable word might lead a researcher to 
encounter related concepts. For instance, although nearly 100 languages are represented in 
the lexicography, many words hail from a select group that are particularly well-studied in 
psychologically-oriented literature, consisting of Chinese, French, German, Greek, Japanese, 
Pāli, and Sanskrit. Thus, an enquiry into a word from these languages would often lead the 
researcher to a text in which related words are discussed. Such words would then also be 
added to the lexicography.  
In thus adding a word – whether based on a suggestion to the website, or through 
snowballing – the same checking procedure was followed as in Lomas’s (2016) initial paper. 
Definitions were sought through various means, including on-line dictionaries, peer-reviewed 
academic sources, and bilingual colleagues. Moreover, once these words and their definitions 
had been added to the lexicography, they were then accessible on the website for public 
inspection. In some instances, people with knowledge of the word and language in question 
then provided feedback, suggesting a refined or augmented definition of the word. (At a 
rough estimate, of the nearly 2,000 messages to the website so far, around 300 have related 
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and led to the amending of a definition.) This peer and public feedback provides – in addition 
to that from bilingual colleagues –  a further credibility check (which is valued in GT).  
 That said, it must be acknowledged that this subsequent phase of data collection and 
analysis could not be regarded as systematic (not even in the “quasi-systematic” sense of 
Lomas’s (2016) original paper). The spirit of the lexicography is an evolving resource that 
will always be a work-in-progress. After all, there are some 7,000 languages in existence, and 
it is unlikely that any one research project could study them all and retrieve their relevant 
words. However, that does not mean one cannot usefully analyse the lexicography’s existing 
words and emergent themes/categories, even if such analyses are incomplete and subject to 
revision. Indeed, despite the addition of around 800 new words since Lomas’s original paper, 
these have not altered the overall thematic structure created in that paper, with the words 
being accommodated within its framework of meta-categories and categories. In that respect, 
subsequent work on the expanded lexicography has resulted in publications focusing on four 
of the six categories identified in the original paper: spirituality (Lomas, 2018a), love 
(Lomas, 2018b), positive emotions (Lomas, 2017b), and ambivalent emotions (Lomas, 
2018c). To that end, the current paper focuses on the category of virtue/character, which 
comprises over 200 words at present.  
These words were once again analysed using the GT variation developed in Lomas’s 
(2016) original paper. Once again, the data comprised a set of words and their definitions. 
These definitions had been refined and checked in the ways outlined above (e.g., consulting 
dictionaries, peer-reviewed sources, and bilingual speakers, together with website feedback). 
In the first stage of open coding, the words and their definitions were examined for thematic 
content. Next, words were grouped together through constant comparison into five themes. 
This process could be described as intuitive, evolving, and iterative, both in terms of how 
words were aggregated into themes, and how the themes were conceptualised. In terms of 
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aggregating words into themes, this process could be deemed intuitive since, unlike in factor 
analysis (with its recourse to statistical techniques), choosing which thematic structure 
provides the “best fit” for the data mainly relies on the researcher’s informed judgement (with 
the author being the sole researcher). In that respect, it was a judgement that evolved. For 
instance, some themes here include subthemes, such as “considerateness” (which involves 
“awareness” and “care”), and agency (which involves “willpower” and “self-control”). At 
early stages in the analysis, thought was given to having these subthemes be themes in their 
own right. However, aggregating them into larger composite themes ultimately seemed the 
most parsimonious solution. The process was also iterative, with the thematic labels being 
revised, including in response to the peer review process. For instance, the fourth theme was 
initially called “autonomy,” and then “self-determination, before “agency” was settled upon 
as optimal on the advice of a reviewer. However, it is acknowledged that this analytic process 
is somewhat idiosyncratic, shaped by the personal inclinations and perspectives of the author. 
For example, the fifth theme is labelled “skill,” mainly based on how the idea of skilfulness is 
used in Buddhist teachings (as discussed below). Thus, other researchers could easily have 
chosen to configure and label the themes differently, based on their own situatedness and 
reading of the data. Finally, a single “core” category was generated, namely virtue. A version 
of this core category had been in mind from the start of the analysis, so it cannot be deemed a 
truly inductively-derived core category. That said, prior to the analysis undertaken for this 
present paper, the category had been labelled “character.” However, subsequently it was 
renamed “virtue,” as this was a better fit with the themes generated inductively here. 
Results and Discussion 
The words analysed fell into five broad themes: virtue; considerateness; wisdom; agency; and 
skill. Collectively, one might regard these as the “roots” of virtue, i.e., the main sources from 
which virtue springs. These are illustrated in figure 1 below, which is not intended to be 
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sequential or circular, but rather implies that all themes are interlinked (as indicated by the 
double-headed arrows). The themes are discussed in turn below, featuring a selection of 
relevant words. 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the main themes 
 
Virtue 
The analysis begins with the foundational concept of virtue itself, the notion that a person can 
be virtuous. This represents a meta-theme which encompasses all the specific virtues and 
strengths found in taxonomies like the VIA. In that sense, it mirrors McGrath’s (2015b) 
analysis, which, prior to resolving into a three-factor solution, obtained a single broad factor 
of “good character.” Likewise, in a psycho-lexical analysis of the Dutch language – focused 
on the Big Five personality framework – DeRaad and Van Oudenhoven (2011) similarly 
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identified a broad virtue factor. This foundational concept of virtue is reflected in terms 
across cultures, each of which could be deemed untranslatable (in that they cannot be 
perfectly translated as “virtue”), and so bring further nuance to our understanding of this idea. 
For instance, thinkers in classical Greece emphasised the importance of arête. This was an 
overarching mark of virtue, encompassing the specific qualities that constitute it (of which 
various taxonomies were developed, such as Plato’s (380 BCE) valorisation of sophia, 
andreia, sophrosune, and dikaiosuné, which can be rendered roughly as wisdom, courage, 
self-restraint, and justice). Arête, then, would mean excelling at any or all, denoting general 
excellence or quality. The term did not only apply to humans, but to anything that excelled at 
its “inherent” purpose (such as an athletic horse). In relation to humans, it often signified 
moral excellence, although it also included meanings that would not usually be linked to 
morality today, such as physical prowess. Similarly, it is often translated simply as “virtue,” a 
word derived from the Latin virtus, frequently regarded as equivalent to arête. As with arête 
though, virtus had certain connotations, reflective of the culture at the time, that we would not 
now associate with virtue, such as “manliness.”  
As to what virtue consists of, Aristotle emphasised the notion of mesos, i.e., mean or 
middle (with mesos the basis for these English terms themselves). In relation to Aristotle, its 
importance is usually highlighted by the label “golden mean,” whereby the virtuous course of 
action treads the delicate middle line between the opposing vices of excess and deficiency 
(e.g., courage represents the optimal point between rashness and cowardice) (Telfer, 1989). 
This is not simply an appeal to moderation, nor splitting the difference between oppositional 
qualities, such as truthfulness and untruthfulness (e.g., being moderately truthful). Rather, it 
means one’s reaction should be carefully calibrated based on the context, and may fall 
anywhere on a spectrum as appropriate. This notion of skilfully treading a middle line is 
common to many traditions. For instance, the Buddha referred to his path as the Madhyama 
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Marga, Middle Way in Sanskrit. That said, one must be wary of drawing false equivalences 
between apparently similar ideas. In this case, the Buddhist Middle Way has been interpreted 
in various ways, not all compatible with Aristotle’s golden mean, including the transcending 
of dualistic thinking itself (Garfield, 1995). This point is important to bear in mind generally 
throughout analysis. Just because terms have been assembled within a theme does not imply 
they necessarily mesh harmoniously; on occasions, terms may be in tension or conflict. 
There are then numerous appellations for people who manage to attain virtue. Some 
describe exemplars who have reached specific religious/spiritual peaks. For example, the 
term Buddhism derives from the honorific Buddha, given to the historic person of Siddhārtha 
Gautama, which translates as “Awakened one.” Relatedly, arhat is sometimes used 
synonymously with Buddha, with both denoting superlative human beings. For instance, the 
Dhammapada describes an arhat as “firm as a high pillar and as pure as a deep pool free 
from mud… wholly freed, perfectly tranquil and wise” (cited in Buddharakkhita, 2008, p.44). 
Most religious/spiritual traditions have similar descriptors for their exemplars, of which there 
are far too many to detail here. (And again, to emphasise the point above, such descriptors are 
not identical, and there may indeed be significant differences between traditions in how their 
exemplars are conceived.) However, one more term does warrant mention, the Yiddish 
mensch, as in addition to its Judaic religious/spiritual connotations, it more generally denotes 
a “good human being in its fullest sense,” and has become a loanword on that basis 
(Blumberg, 2006, p.724). Added to this are words that, in different ways, describe a virtuous 
person. For instance, the German adjective fein conveys bearing and grace, encompassing 
nobility, honour, tenderness, uniqueness, and authenticity (Baer & Olshanskaya, 2014).  
Thus, numerous words bring subtle nuances to the general notion of virtue. Such 
terms then generate further questions as to its dynamics, including why a person might be 
Running head: THE ROOTS OF VIRTUE 
19 
 
virtuous, how they would know how to, and how they would manage to. These are addressed 
in the following three sections, under considerateness, wisdom, and agency respectively.  
Considerateness 
A crucial component of virtue appears to be considerateness (a term derived from the Latin 
consîderâtus). It might help to think of this as a motivational aspect of virtue: although it 
itself is an expression or manifestation of virtue, it arguably also plays something of a causal 
role as a driving force behind its cultivation. This is the case in Buddhist teachings, for 
instance, with respect to the Pāli notion of sati (Lomas, 2017a), which we shall consider 
below. In terms of the VIA factor analytic components, this theme has parallels with such 
factors as interpersonal strengths (Peterson et al., 2008), agreeableness (Park & Peterson, 
2005), niceness (Macdonald et al., 2008), and caring (McGrath, 2015b). The latter quality in 
particular was central to the analysis here. However, this theme of considerateness comprised 
two essential qualities: awareness and care. That is, to care about the impact of one’s actions 
(both on others and oneself), arguably one must first be aware of that impact (since logically 
it is hard to care about things one is unaware of).  
 Regarding awareness, a notable term in this respect is the aforementioned sati. This is 
a complex, polysemous term, with a rich history of evolving meanings, about which much 
could be said (Lomas, 2017a). Indeed, most terms explored here justify in-depth treatments, 
exploring their nuances at length; however, to achieve the comparative analysis aimed for 
here requires an inevitable trade-off between depth and breadth. Thus, with sati it is sufficient 
to note it is the basis – as a loan translation, i.e., semantic borrowing – for mindfulness, which 
has become somewhat ubiquitous in the West. For instance, drawing on treatments of sati in 
the Pāli canon, Kabat-Zinn (2003, p.145) defines mindfulness as “the awareness that arises 
through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally to the 
unfolding of experience moment by moment.” However, in its original Buddhist context, sati 
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had an implicit moral dimension (e.g., of the impact of one’s actions, and the extent to which 
they align with Buddhist precepts), even if this dimension is not necessarily retained in 
modern conceptualisations of mindfulness. In addition, Buddhism has other terms around 
awareness that explicitly embed a moral dimension, like apramāda, interpreted as 
“awareness… with regard to the sphere of qualities of good conduct” (Carter, 2005, p.280).  
 In addition to awareness of one’s actions, considerateness involves caring about their 
implications, which means caring generally about others. As per taxonomies of virtue, there 
are likewise numerous schemas relating to kindness and compassion. To again use Buddhism 
as an example, Theravada schools valorise four brahma-vihārās, a phrase that translates as 
“abodes of brahma” (with Brahma being the Vedic term for the creative deity). In this context 
the term denotes four qualities – qualified by the adjective apramāṇa, meaning immeasurable 
or boundless – that practitioners are encouraged to cultivate: maitrī (often rendered as 
“loving-kindness”); karuṇā (compassion); muditā (sympathetic happiness); and upeksha 
(equanimity). Or consider classical Greek, which had a wealth of terms relating to affection 
and love – as outlined in depth in Lomas (2018b) – including storgē, denoting familial bonds; 
philia, which pertains more to companionship; and agape, for charitable, selfless love. 
These diverse forms of care might all be regarded as instances of the more general 
“golden rule,” which articulates an ideal of reciprocity. This principle has been developed by 
many traditions, from Confucianism to Judaism. With the former, the Analects include a 
passage in which Confucius is responding to the question of whether there is a “single word 
that can serve as a guide to conduct throughout one's life?” He replies with shù, which he 
defines as “Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you” (cited in 
Allinson, 2003, p.29); he then further describes this reciprocity as the very essence of rén 
(humaneness). Also implicit in such terms is a sense of why one should be considerate in this 
way. Concepts such as rén describe a moral sensibility in which others are deemed inherently 
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worthy of good treatment. Moreover, terms like apramāda embed an understanding of 
processes such as karma, which in contexts like Hinduism and Buddhism describes a theory 
of causality with respect to ethics, whereby ethical actions not only benefit the recipient, but 
the actor too (e.g., vis-à-vis future positive outcomes and mental states) (Kang, 2009). Thus, 
with apramāda, not only would a person recognise the inherent value of treating others well, 
but from a perspective of enlightened self-interest, realise that they themselves also benefit. 
That is not to say virtue is ego-centrically motivated; the point is just that, in addition to their 
primary other-centred motivations, the virtuous actor may gain further motivation from 
understanding that acting thus is also likely to assist their own flourishing (Frimer et al., 
2011). So, in various ways, considerateness helps explain why people might want to be 
virtuous. It also provides people with clues as to how to act virtuously. This form of moral 
understanding then comes to the fore with the third theme. 
Wisdom 
Considerateness encompasses motivations for virtue, and moreover may indicate what virtue 
consists of in a given situation. This notion of understanding is then brought to fruition with 
the theme of wisdom. Recall that, with respect to the golden mean, this does not simply mean 
mechanically bisecting two extremes, but skilfully judging the best course of action relative 
to the situation. How, then, can one judge? Here we come to the importance of wisdom and 
understanding. In terms of the VIA factor analytic components, this theme has parallels with 
factors such as cognitive strengths (Peterson et al., 2008) and intellectual strengths (Ruch et 
al., 2010). Two important concepts from classical Greece in this respect are sophia and 
phrónêsis, which Aristotle regarded as the two “intellectual” virtues (Fischer, 2015).  The 
former denotes a more abstract, theoretical, or even transcendent wisdom, whereas the latter 
depicts a “practical” intelligence, determining ends (i.e., what goals to pursue) and the best 
means of attaining them. Aristotle contrasted both with other epistemological concepts, like 
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episteme, which pertains to knowledge (e.g., in a scientific sense), and techne, which 
concerns craft skills and practical expertise.  
 Terms relating to wisdom are found across the world’s languages, all with nuances 
derived from their cultural context. While it is beyond the scope here to cover all such terms, 
by way of example, it is instructive to consider one language that is particularly rich in this 
regard. Courtesy of a rich philosophical tradition over recent centuries, German has a unique 
lexicon of concepts relating to wisdom. Some began as relatively common terms in discourse, 
before assuming specialised meanings in academia, particularly philosophy and psychology. 
In these latter contexts, many became loanwords, harnessed initially by scholars, before 
sometimes becoming even more widely adopted. Weltanschauung, for instance, initially 
referred to a world-view or outlook, i.e., an overarching philosophy of life. However, it also 
began to be deployed by scholars, most prominently Dilthey, to articulate the epistemological 
claim that people appraise the world from a particular standpoint; this notion then played a 
key role in fields like psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, and critical thought (Makkreel, 1992).  
Similarly influential are Gestalt and Ganzheit, which have provided the foundation for 
entire paradigms within psychology. While the former initially just meant form or shape, it 
was harnessed in a philosophical context by von Ehrenfels (1890), who used it to denote the 
overall configuration of something, and moreover to depict the whole as being other (often 
“greater”) than the sum of its parts. He further saw Gestalt processing as a fundamental 
feature of the mind, whereby people grasp patterns as a whole. The concept led to paradigms 
like Gestalt psychotherapy, associated with Perls (1969, p.71), who saw it as being concerned 
with “the total existence of a person.” Similarly, Ganzheit connotes unity, completeness, and 
an “integrated whole,” and is often rendered as holistic (Wolvekamp, 1966, p.196). This 
concept led to fields like Ganzheit Psychology, described as the “holistic study of human 
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nature”; indeed, when Wundt established his Institute for Experimental Psychology in 1879, 
his work was often referred to as Ganzheit Psychology (Blumenthal, 1975). 
The foregoing section, while obviously not exhaustive, highlights the role of wisdom 
in virtue. However, in addition to striving to be virtuous (considerateness), and knowing what 
it consists of (wisdom), these count for little if one cannot manage to be virtuous. 
Agency 
While considerateness and wisdom are necessary for virtue, in themselves they may not be 
sufficient. For one must be able to be virtuous, as covered by the fourth theme here, agency. 
There is a considerable psychological literature on the importance and nature of agency. For 
instance, in Ryan and Deci’s (2000) theory of self-determination, agency – labelled using its 
near-synonym autonomy – is conceptualised as one of three essential psychological needs, 
alongside competence and relatedness, that “appear to be essential for facilitating optimal 
functioning of the natural propensities for growth and integration, as well as for constructive 
social development and personal well-being” (p.68). In the present context, agency can be 
regarded as the freedom and capacity to make and pursue one’s own value-driven choices. 
With respect to virtue, this appears to involve two counterpart factors: willpower (e.g., 
motivation to do right), and self-control (e.g., refraining from doing wrong).  
 With willpower, relevant words fall into three broad areas: energy, perseverance, and 
independence. In terms of the VIA factor analytic components, these sub-themes have 
parallels with factors such as fortitude (Peterson et al., 2008), emotional strengths (Ruch et 
al., 2010), self-assurance (Singh & Choubisa, 2010), and vitality (Brdar & Kashdan, 2010). 
Taking energy first, many languages have terms conveying vitality and passion (see Huta and 
Ryan, 2010, and Vallerand, 2012, for the importance to wellbeing of vitality and passion 
respectively). One of the earliest and most important is the classical Greek thumos. While 
sometimes rendered as “spiritedness,” it carried many important meanings, including soul, 
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spirit, will, temper, and courage, and was described as “the principle of life” (Lynch & Miles, 
1980, p.3). Similarly, there are terms expressing energy and enthusiasm, like the Swedish 
verb orka, defined as “to have enough energy to be able to” (Johansson & Nordrum, 2016 
p.186). Some terms invoke a mythological or spiritual conception of power, like orenda (of 
the Huron people), and the related concept of mana (found in Polynesian languages). Both 
ideas are rooted in worldviews that view the cosmos as suffused with spiritual energy/power 
that can be harnessed by people, particularly in exceptional circumstances (Saraydar, 1990).  
Willpower is not only a question of energy, but also perseverance. Some words here 
are particularly vital, viewed as integral to or characteristic of their culture. Finnish celebrates 
sisu, which, beyond mere perseverance, is exalted as a nation-defining quality of courageous 
determination that has enabled the country to thrive in adversity (Lucas & Buzzanell, 2004). 
Somewhat similarly, the Arabic sumud connotes steadfastness, but more deeply can describe 
a determined existential struggle to persist and survive (Nassar, 2011). Added to these are 
terms that further trace the contours of perseverance. For instance, three Greek terms are 
deployed in the New Testament to describe the legendary forbearance of Job: hypomonē 
(conveying constancy and endurance); kartería (stubbornness and toughness); and 
makrothumeó (patience).  
Thirdly, willpower also involves independence, as reflected in various words, some 
with more positive connotations than others. Positioned as more benign are terms expressing 
yearning for freedom. For instance, German has Fernweh and Wanderlust to convey longing 
for distant lands and/or travel. Relatedly, the Japanese datsuzoku exalts freedom from habit 
and routine, and has been embraced by traditions such as Zen (Lomas, Etcoff, Gordon, & 
Shonin, 2017). By contrast, other terms walk a fine-line between admiring the audacity of 
agency, while conveying wariness at excessive free-spiritedness. These include the Yiddish 
chutzpah, with connotations of brazenness and nerve, and the German Willkür, which 
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describes following one’s own will, but with a somewhat disparaging sense of wantonly 
disregarding rules and conventions. 
Thus, many cultures do not view independence as an unqualified good, but recognise 
it potentially leads to problematic waywardness. People can have multiple, even conflicting 
drives, some benign, some malign. As such, adaptive agency needs the restraining hand of 
self-control to guide it. In terms of the VIA factor analytic components, this sub-theme has 
parallels with factors such as temperance (Peterson et al., 2008), strengths of restraint (Ruch 
et al., 2010), conscientiousness (Park & Peterson, 2005), and of course self-control (McGrath, 
2015b; McGrath et al., 2017). Various words valorise self-control, or alternatively lament its 
absence. Greek is particularly rich in that regard. For instance, classical thinkers exalted 
sophrosyne, which depicts excellence of character and soundness of mind, associated with 
self-restraining qualities like temperance and moderation. Similarly, autexeusious describes 
self-mastery, exercising agency independently of the passions/emotions. Conversely, from a 
deficit perspective, Aristotle suggested that immoral people suffer from akrásia – weakness 
of will – that prevents them acting in their best interests. However, Aristotle brought an 
interesting perspective to bear on the issue of self-control. Many theories of virtue emphasise 
the importance of self-control for its enactment. For instance, Baumeister and Exline (1999) 
suggest that “insofar as virtue depends on overcoming selfish or antisocial impulses for the 
sake of what is best for the group or collective, self-control can be said to be the master 
virtue” (p.1165). For Aristotle though, that one requires self-control to act virtuously would 
actually reveal lack of virtue, since a virtuous person would intrinsically want to act morally 
(Telfer, 1989). This example reinforces the point above that even though a given construct or 
theme may pertain to virtue, there can be significant differences in how these are regarded 
across and within traditions and cultural contexts.  
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Finally, the outcome of the qualities featured in the four themes above is an ability to 
live skilfully, as the final theme elucidates. 
Skill 
If one cares about virtue (considerateness), knows what it consists of (wisdom), and can 
pursue it (agency), the result is a covetous capacity to live skilfully. I am not merely using 
“skill” and “skilful” instrumentally here, implying a technique or ability which one might 
either use or set aside as expedient. Rather, the spirit in which the term is invoked relates to 
the Buddhist notion of upāya, which although usually translated as skill, refers more to a 
cultivated way of being that involves the ability to live well, which in that context especially 
means cultivating and enacting virtue (Pye, 2004). Thus, skill here means virtue in its 
broadest sense, not just being moral/ethical, but a more general excellence (as per arête). In 
terms of the VIA factor analytic components, this theme aligns most with factors such as 
interpersonal strengths (Peterson et al., 2008), civic strengths (Singh & Choubisa, 2010), and 
social strengths (Shryack et al., 2010), although it also contains elements not represented by 
these factors (such as practical capabilities, as elucidated below). This sense of skilful living 
is reflected in various French nouns based around savoir, such as savoir-faire, -être and -
vivre (Sercu, 2002). Savoir is one of two French verbs meaning to know, and denotes 
“knowing how to” (in contrast to connaître, which refers more to knowing someone or 
something). Each compound term thus traces different nuances of this notion of skilfulness.  
Perhaps most well-known is savoir-faire, featuring the verb faire, meaning to make or 
do. This conveys knowing how to behave in a given situation, and is often described using 
synonyms such as diplomacy, finesse, and poise. It can also refer to practical, technical, or 
problem-solving skills. These varied meanings are captured in a range of words. Skilfully 
undertaking a task is reflected in the Greek praxis, which can simply mean deed or action, but 
in philosophical terms describes the process through which a theory or skill is enacted or 
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embodied. Greek also featured kairos, signifying the right/opportune time to do something, or 
also the right measure in doing it. Kairos was a central topic in Greek literature and rhetoric, 
as seen in the proverb attributed to Hesiod (circa 7th Century BCE): “Observe due measure, 
and proportion [kairos] is best in all things” (Kinneavy, 2002, p.58). This ideal of kairos also 
pertains to the theme of wisdom, particularly the golden mean. (This kind of coding dilemma 
is common in qualitative analysis, where codes can often be situated within multiple themes.) 
Skilful problem-solving is reflected in the Portuguese desenrascanço, roughly translatable as 
disentanglement, which describes imaginative resourcefulness in the face of new/unexpected 
situations or problems. Likewise, the Italian verb arrangiarsi means to make do or get by – 
often prefixed by l'arte d' (the art of), as is desenrascanço – particularly in difficult 
circumstances. (That said, it sometimes has negative connotations, e.g., something achieved 
through underhand methods.)  
The second savoir term is savoir-être, which appends “to be,” thus implying knowing 
how to “carry” oneself. This has similar connotations to savior-faire, with both described 
using terms like diplomacy, tact, and social grace. However, savoir-être has an even greater 
emphasis on interpersonal skills (in contrast to the more practical qualities implied by savior-
faire). Such skills are reflected in the Greek eunoia, from eu (good, well, beautiful), and noia 
(mind, thinking). This not only depicts an inner quality of mind, but an interpersonal 
phenomenon, whereby a person transmits goodwill, empathy and approval to others, and 
inspires these in others in return. Or take the German Konfliktfähigkeit, which denotes an 
ability to manage interpersonal conflict constructively (e.g., without becoming personally 
embroiled). Capturing more a sense of open-mindedness and flexibility is kokusaijin, which 
rose to prominence in Japan towards the end of the 20th Century. Meaning “international 
person,” it describes someone who is cosmopolitan, usually well-travelled, and generally 
adept at engaging with other cultures (Yoneoka, 2000). Savoir-être can also connote grace, 
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charm, and elegance, depicting a beautiful character. This is reflected in the Italian noun 
leggiadria – described as “poetry in motion” (Fermor, 1998, p.124) – which played a key role 
in Renaissance art, encompassing such qualities as gracefulness, loveliness, prettiness and 
elegance. On a somewhat different note, one finds valued aesthetics associated with Japanese 
culture, and Zen in particular, such as shibumi and shizen (Lomas et al., 2017). The former 
articulates a simple, unobtrusive, and effortless beauty, while the latter relatedly identifies 
beauty with naturalness, an absence of pretence, contrivance, or premeditation. Such qualities 
are prized, not only in artworks, but especially in people, where they are seen as embodying 
the kinds of insight and practice that Buddhism upholds, such as disavowing attachments, and 
cultivating a life that is simple, clean and pure. 
The third French compound term is savoir-vivre, which deploys “to live” to articulate 
knowing how to live well. Indeed, France’s reputation in excelling thus is reflected in several 
terms – embraced as loanwords/phrases – that embody this ideal. For instance, joie de vivre 
articulates a zest for life; it is, as Harrow and Unwin (2009) put it, “a Weltanschauung, a 
behavioural mode and form of practice. It is joy generalised, a result of many experiences, a 
sustained and boundless enjoyment of the here and now” (p.19). Similarly, bon vivant 
describes someone who enjoys and appreciates the good life, as do equivalents in other 
languages, like the Swedish noun livsnjutare. It is also reflected in expressions that encourage 
people to live fully and/or have a good time, like the Hebrew la’asot chaim, which literally 
means “to do or to make life.” Perhaps here too one could include words that convey the 
attainment of purpose in life, such as the Japanese ikigai, which translates as a “reason for 
being,” reflecting an appraisal that life is “good and meaningful” (Yamamoto-Mitani & 
Wallhagen, 2002, p.399).  
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Conclusion 
This paper was guided by a twofold research question: (a) are there concepts pertaining to 
virtue in other languages that have not been similarly identified in English (as signalled by an 
untranslatable word); and (b) what are their implications for our understanding of virtue? The 
analysis itself was driven by (a), and, following an adapted form of GT, the result was an 
appraisal of (b). In that respect, the analysis identified five key interlinked themes which 
together might be regarded as the “roots” of virtue – the main sources from which it springs, 
illustrating why a person might aim, and then actually manage, to be virtuous. The first theme 
denotes the idea of virtue per se – that one can be virtuous (regardless of which specific 
behaviours constitute virtue). Next, considerateness explains why one would want to be, 
involving two essential qualities: awareness (of the impact of one’s actions), and care (being 
concerned about any such impact). The third dimension, wisdom, covers knowing how to be 
virtuous, including faculties of judgement and understanding. Fourth, agency addresses the 
issue of managing to be virtuous, involving the willpower to be virtuous, and the self-control 
to carry it out. The final dimension is skill, reflecting the notion that successfully enacting the 
preceding qualities would result in living skilfully, not only with respect to morals/ethics, but 
more broadly attaining “excellence” (as per arête).  
It must be noted that this schema – as illustrated in figure 1 above – is simply a 
representation of the themes identified in the data. It cannot be regarded as a fully-fledged 
theory or even a model of virtue; that would be beyond the remit of the analysis here. For a 
start, the lexical search undertaken remains partial and a work-in progress, given that the 
lexicography currently only features around 100 languages, out of some 7,000 in existence. 
There are thus likely to be many relevant terms included neither in the analysis above, nor the 
lexicography as it stands. Moreover, some cultures and traditions have been considered in 
more depth than others (e.g., Buddhism), which reflects the personal interests of the author, 
Running head: THE ROOTS OF VIRTUE 
30 
 
which drove the conceptual snowballing in certain directions. Moreover, of the words that 
have been included, their analysis has been inevitably restricted, limited by attempting to 
convey an overarching comparative analysis within the constraints of an article. Moreover, 
given that translation is a problematic exercise, it will not have been possible to arrive at 
definitions that would satisfy all speakers of the donor language. Given the fluidity and 
complexity of language use, there are always many ways of interpreting a given word. Thus, 
the descriptions here are merely one way of elucidating these terms, and ultimately are based 
on the author’s interpretation of the source material. That said, dictionaries and scholarly 
sources were consulted in the aim of arriving at valid descriptions. 
As such, the analysis is not a complete account of all the potential untranslatable 
words that exist pertaining to virtue. It is rather an imperfect snapshot of the current state of 
the lexicography with respect to virtue, one that is partial and subject to revision. However, 
that does not mean it is without value; even without being “complete,” the analysis may still 
shed further light on virtue, highlighting nuances and complexities that may be missing from 
accounts that are only in English. In that respect, the analysis may augment the factor 
analyses of the VIA adumbrated above, although it cannot determine which solution is 
optimal. The themes have resonances with all the solutions, and yet the analysis does not 
align perfectly with any, even five-factor ones. Take Peterson et al.’s (2008) structure of 
interpersonal strengths, cognitive strengths, fortitude, temperance, and transcendence. The 
only close matches are that the themes of considerateness and wisdom overlap with their 
factors of interpersonal strengths and cognitive strengths respectively, while agency appears 
to encompass two of their factors (fortitude and temperance). Other than that, the theme of 
virtue is more of a general component (mirroring McGrath’s (2015b) single broad factor of 
“good character”), and skill perhaps interweaves all of Peterson et al.’s factors, while their 
factor of transcendence does not match any theme. However, to reiterate, the analysis is not a 
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refutation of any factor analytic solution. The point of the paper was not a comprehensive 
assessment of virtue, since that is beyond its scope. Rather, its more modest aim was simply 
to shed light on aspects of virtue that might be overlooked within current theorising (due to a 
concept not being identified in English).  
In sum, the results do not constitute a new structural model of virtue or strengths that 
could supplant existing factor-analytically-derived models. Rather, it offers a different “take” 
on the dynamics of virtue that researchers in the field might find useful. And in that respect, it 
corroborates Ruch and Proyer’s (2015) contention that there are other means of exploring the 
structure of virtue and strengths besides factor analysis (which in their case meant harnessing 
expert ratings). That is, researchers investigating the VIA taxonomy may find conceptual 
“food for thought” in the present analysis as they interpret their data. For instance, the five-
fold thematic structure here may be relevant to theorists making judgements regarding the 
factorial solutions to their data (as we saw above with McGrath, 2015b). However, it bears 
emphasising that the analysis here is provisional and partial, and will benefit from being 
refined through further empirical research, both qualitative and quantitative. With the former, 
the thematic structure identified here would be strengthened (or challenged) by the inclusion 
and consideration of many more untranslatable words than the 200-or-so included here. With 
the latter, it might be feasible to develop a psychometric scale based on the schema developed 
here, and then subject this to factor-analysis or other such procedures (e.g., expert ratings as 
per Ruch and Proyer, 2015). This scale and the resulting analysis could then be more directly 
compared with established factor-analytic solutions to the VIA classificatory schema (beyond 
the tentative links drawn throughout the paper). Even as it is, though, the analysis may 
hopefully prove useful to those studying virtue, and can feed into future such work on this 
topic. 
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